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PRIVATE ACTIONS UNDER THE SUITABILITY




A number of courts have implied private causes of action
against securities broker-dealers for their breach of the supervi-
sion and suitability duties imposed by the self-regulatory rules of
the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of
Securities Dealers. The prevailing view denies recovery in the ab-
sence of conduct "tantamount to fraud." In examining the devel-
opment of the fraud requiremen, the author distinguishes Rule
10b-5 actions and contends that such a strict curtailment of ac-
tions brought under self-regulatory rules is not compelled by
clear judicial precedent or by legislative purpose.
In providing for the registration of stock exchanges with the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Congress enacted sec-
tion 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).1
Section 6 prohibits registration of an exchange unless its internal
rules provide for the expulsion, suspension, or discipline of mem-
bers for conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of
trade.2 At the same time, Congress granted exchanges the power
to enact these self-regulatory rules. 3 Amendments to the Ex-
change Act were later enacted to impose similar requirements of
registration and self-regulation on voluntary associations of over-
the-counter broker-dealers who are not members of a stock ex-
change.4
Eventually, investors sought to use the federal district courts to
assert damages claims against their securities broker-dealers for
alleged violations of certain of these exchange and dealer associa-
1. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976)).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976).
3. Ch. 404, § 6, 48 Stat. 885 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976)).
4. As added, ch. 677, § 1, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938).
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tion rules. Such claims have most frequently involved violations
of the "suitability" and "supervision" rules of the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE)5 and the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD).6 The theory of civil liability for breach of these
rules is based on section 27 of the Exchange Act, which grants the
federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear "all suits in
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty
created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder."
7
Proponents of implied federal causes of action have maintained
that some of these rules impose duties upon broker-dealers
within the meaning of section 27.8
Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.9 was the first case to sug-
gest that violations of exchange and dealer association rules
might give rise to a private action for damages.' 0 In Colonial,
Judge Friendly stated that in considering whether to imply fed-
eral civil liability, a "court must look to the nature of the particu-
5. Rule 405 of the New York Stock Exchange states:
Every member organization is required through a general partner, a
principal executive officer or a person or persons designated under the
provisions of Rule 342(b) (1) to
(1) Use due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every cus-
tomer, every order, every cash or margin account accepted or carried by
such organization and every person holding power of attorney over any
account accepted or carried by such organization.
(2) Supervise diligently all accounts handled by registered representa-
tives of the organization.
(3) Specifically approve the opening of an account prior to or promptly
after the completion of any transaction for the account of or with a cus-
tomer .... The member, general partner [or] officer approving the open-
ing of the account shall, prior to giving his approval, be personally
informed as to the essential facts relative to the customer and to the na-
ture of the proposed account and shall indicate his approval in writing
[1979] NYSE GumE (CCH) ] 2405, at 3697, 3701. Rule 405 is often referred to as the
"Know Your Customer" rule. Wolfson v. Baker, 444 F. Supp. 1124, 1132 (M.D. Fla.
1978).
6. Article III, § 2 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice provides:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any
security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the
recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts,
if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other security holdings and as
to his financial situation and needs.
[1971] NASD MANuAL (CCH) 2152. The foregoing rule sets forth the NASD "suit-
ability" provision. For the NASD "supervision" duty, see note 35 infra.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976). Even if an exchange or association rule is not con-
sidered to be a rule "thereunder," a violation of such a rule may nevertheless be
actionable as a "duty created by this chapter." See Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities
Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUm. L. REV. 12, 18-19 (1966).
8. See, e.g., Wolfson v. Baker, 444 F. Supp. 1124, 1133 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
9. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
10. The Colonial court ultimately concluded that no private cause of action
was stated for violation of an NASD rule requiring observance of "high standards
of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade." Id. at 183.
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lar rule and its place in the regulatory scheme."" According to
the Colonial court, rules imposing broad duties, such as the one
under consideration in Colonial,12 are too vague to be enforced by
implying a private cause of action. The court further stated that
the party urging implication of federal liability carries a greater
burden of persuasion when no statute or SEC regulation has been
violated.' 3 "The case for implication would be strongest when the
rule imposes an explicit duty unknown to the common law."'
4
Following the lead of the Colonial decision, a number of courts
have concluded that in appropriate circumstances, violations of
exchange and association rules designed for investor protection
may give rise to a private right of action.' 5 Other courts have
flatly refused to find the breach of any of the self-regulatory rules
actionable.' 6 In light of such divergent views, the district court in
Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc. recently stated that
whether an investor may prevail in a private cause of action for
violation of these rules is an "open question."'
7
Despite the series of decisions that accepts the proposition that
such liability may exist, no reported cases exist in which a bro-
ker-dealer has actually been held liable solely for the violation of
NYSE or NASD rules.' 8 Nevertheless, the district court in Rolfv.
Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc. concluded that the "prevailing"
view is that these rules may form the basis of liability in damages
but only if the plaintiff alleges and demonstrates that the broker's
violation of the rule was fraudulent, or at least "tantamount to
fraud."19
Thus, to avoid dismissal of his claim under the "prevailing"
11. Id. at 182.
12. See note 10 supra.
13. 358 F.2d at 182.
14. Id.
15. E.g., Ocrant v. Dean Witter & Co., 502 F.2d 854, 858 (10th Cir. 1974); Avern
Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 963 (1970);
Wolfson v. Baker, 444 F. Supp. 1124, 1134 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
16. Parsons v. Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, 447 F. Supp. 482, 494
(M.D.N.C. 1977), affid per curiam, 571 F.2d 203 (1978); Plunkett v. Dominick &
Dominick, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 885, 890 (D. Conn. 1976).
17. 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affid on other grounds, 570 F.2d 38
(2d Cir. 1978). The court of appeals commented that of the two issues reserved by
the court, the question of broker liability under NYSE or NASD rules was the
"thornier." 570 F.2d at 48 n.19.
18. Wolfson v. Baker, 444 F. Supp. 1124, 1133 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
19. 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aFd on other grounds, 570 F.2d 38
(2d Cir. 1978).
view, a plaintiff must allege not only breach of the proper type of
rule as indicated by Colonial but also facts that tend to show that
his broker's violation of such rule was in some way fraudulent.
One court has observed that by requiring fraudulent conduct, the
courts have "fashioned the contours of liability for rules viola-
tions."20 Rather, the fraud requirement may amount to a repudia-
tion of these rules as an independent basis for liability.21 To the
extent a broker's violation is fraudulent, a cause of action may be
stated under SEC Rule 10b-5,22 and the self-regulatory rules be-
come superfluous. 23
This Comment contends that civil liability for rules violations
should not hinge on whether the violating conduct is fraudulent.
In fact, several of the decisions recognizing an implied cause of
action have not expressly required a showing of fraud, insisting
only that the breached rule be designed for the protection of the
investing public.24 Although the fraud requirement would un-
doubtedly ease the federal court workload,25 such a limitation un-
necessarily frustrates the acknowledged congressional purposes
served by holding brokers civilly liable for their violations.26 The
fraud requirement may indeed amount to an indirect repudiation
of this implied theory of liability. Inasmuch as there are other
ways to restrict the volume of litigation brought under the self-
regulatory rules, the fraud/non-fraud distinction appears to be ar-
bitrary.
RECOGNITION OF IMPLIED ACTIONS-THE ABSENCE OF A DEFINITE
FRAUD REQUIREMENT
Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.27 has
been used as underlying authority for the proposition that con-
20. Id. at 1040.
21. See Architectural League v. Bartos, 404 F. Supp. 304, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
23. See E. BRODSKY, GUIDE TO SECURITIES LITIGATION 169 (1974).
24. SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 988 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880
(1972); Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 142 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518, 523-
24 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
25. In the Colonial decision, Judge Friendly cautioned that failure to limit the
scope of implied liability from rules violations would flood the federal courts with
"garden variety" customer-broker lawsuits. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.,
358 F.2d 178, 183 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
26. Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 "to protect the pub-
lic and investors against malpractices in the securities and financial markets."
H.R. REP. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1964] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3013, 3016. Stock exchange and dealer association rules were authorized
to promote the Act's protective goal through self-regulation. S. REP. No. 1455, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. 3-4 (1938); H.R. REP. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 4-5 (1938).
27. 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
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duct tantamount to fraud must be pleaded to state a cause of ac-
tion for the breach of self-regulatory rules. 28 However, Buttrey
did not expressly require conduct tantamount to fraud. The court
first stated that whether the violation of a particular rule is action-
able should depend upon whether its purpose is "the direct pro-
tection of investors. 29 After implying a cause of action for the
defendant's failure to supervise accounts under NYSE Rule 405,30
the court cautiously avoided holding that a violation of Rule 405 is
"per se actionable." 31 Instead of precisely defining the limits of li-
ability, the court concluded that "[ a] Ithough mere errors of judg-
ment by defendant might not support a federal cause of action,
the facts alleged here are tantamount to fraud ... thus giving rise
to a private civil damage action."3 2
At most, this statement permits an action for a violation tanta-
mount to fraud and rules out strict liability. The decision neither
compels the "tantamount to fraud" standard nor prohibits a cause
of action for a negligent violation. Subsequent decisions 33 that in-
terpret Buttrey as foreclosing the possibility of liability for negli-
gence equate "mere errors of judgment" with negligence and read
"might not" as shall not. An error of judgment may be wholly
without legal fault and thus not negligent. The Buttrey court's
mention of "mere errors of judgment" is therefore not necessarily
a reference to negligent errors.
Had the Buttrey court wished to limit the implication of a cause
of action to acts tantamount to fraud, it could have so indicated.
Inasmuch as the court alluded to rules violations constituting
mere errors of judgment as the outer limit of liability, it is possi-
ble to infer that a cause of action may be permitted when the vio-
lating conduct involves any degree of fault. Of course, Buttrey
does not expressly authorize liability for negligent violations. A
fair interpretation of the ambiguous language in that case is that
the question of such liability is left open. Therefore, to the extent
28. Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164, 168 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977); Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 424 F. Supp.
1021, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affid on other grounds, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978); S.
JAFFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SEcuRrIEs MARKETS 196 (1977).
29. Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d at 142.
30. Rule 405 is set out in note 5 supra.
31. Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d at 142.
32. Id. at 143.
33. E.g., Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1041
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), a.fld on other grounds, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978).
Buttrey is relied upon as precluding the implication of a cause of
action for less than fraudulent violations of Rule 405, its holding is
overstated.
Several decisions subsequent to Buttrey suggest that a federal
cause of action may be implied for the violation of stock exchange
or dealer association rules in the absence of fraudulent conduct.
These cases stop short of expressly holding that fraud is an es-
sential element of a cause of action. They do, however, require
that the rule under which liability is asserted be designed for the
protection of investors and the public.
In SEC v. First Securities Co.3 4 the same panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that decided Buttrey considered
a claim for violation of the NASD "supervision" rule.35 First Se-
curities Company, a member broker-dealer of the NASD, em-
ployed its president as an investment counselor. The president
fraudulently converted funds invested by the firm's customers to
his own use.36 He directed customers to mail checks payable to
himself in envelopes labeled "confidential" and sought to conceal
his scheme by imposition of a rule prohibiting employees of First
Securities from opening his mail.37 The court held that by al-
lowing enforcement of the president's rule, First Securities Com-
pany violated the supervision provisions of NASD Rule 27 and
that such violation provided the basis for First Securities' liability
to the customers defrauded by its president. 38
The court's opinion did not include fraudulent conduct as a pre-
requisite for liability based on a firm's failure to comply with the
supervision rule. The court concluded that First Securities' con-
duct was "sufficient without more to constitute a violation" of the
rule, adding only that such violations give rise to private damages
"where the rule violated serves to protect the public."3
9
The result in First Securities presents an ambiguity similar to
that in Buttrey. Neither case expressly conditions liability upon
finding a fraudulent violation. Yet each court concluded that
34. 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972).
35. Article II, § 27 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice provides in part:
(a) Each member shall establish, maintain, and enforce written proce-
dures which will enable it to supervise properly the activities of each reg-
istered representative and associated person to assure compliance with
applicable securities laws, rules, regulations and statements of policy
promulgated thereunder with the rules of this Association.
(b) Final responsibility for proper supervision shall rest with the
member ....
[1971] NASD MIANuAL (CCH) 2177.
36. SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d at 983-84.
37. Id. at 985.
38. Id. at 988.
39. Id.
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some level of fraud was present. In Buttrey, the facts alleged
were explicitly found to be "tantamount to fraud."40 In a separate
section of the First Securities opinion dealing with an alternative
basis for the firm's liability, the court held that First Securities
Company aided and abetted the president's fraud by "willfully"
allowing his enforcement of the rule regarding the mail. 4 1 Appar-
ently the court found that the firm's failure to supervise was will-
ful, thereby constituting an independent act of actionable fraud
for aiding and abetting the president's fraud.42 However, the
court did not characterize First Securities' failure to supervise as
willful until the opinion turned to a discussion of aiding and abet-
ting liability. The preceding section of the opinion treating liabil-
ity under the supervision rule failed to refer to the fim's
willfulness. If the court felt that willfulness was essential to a
cause of action based on the supervision rule, why was the finding
of the firm's willfulness not mentioned until the subsequent sec-
tion of the opinion devoted to aiding and abetting?
Similarly, the decision in Starkman v. Seroussi43 did not men-
tion fraud as an essential element of a plaintiff's implied cause of
action. In Starkman, an investor alleged breach of NYSE Rules
40544 and 345.16.45 Defendants, the brokerage firm and its em-
ployee, Seroussi, asserted that the brokerage agreement signed
by plaintiff compelled the latter to submit his claim to arbitra-
tion.1 6 The court ruled that because the rules violations alleged
gave rise to a cause of action under section 27 of the Exchange
Act of 1934,47 the agreement to arbitrate was void as against the
plaintiff's right to maintain his action in federal court.48 In con-
cluding that the plaintiff had sufficiently carried his burden to es-
tablish jurisdiction by stating a cause of action, the court looked
40. Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 143 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
41. SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d at 988.
42. To establish aiding and abetting liability under the securities laws, the
plaintiff must prove that an independent wrong existed and either that the alleged
aider and abettor had knowledge of the wrong or that he acted with reckless disre-
gard. Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255, 268 n.10 (2d Cir. 1975).
43. 377 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
44. Rule 405 is set out in note 5 supra.
45. Rule 345.16 prohibits a registered representative from participating in
transactions with customers by sharing in profits or by guaranteeing the customer
against losses. [19791 NYSE GUmE (CCH) 2345, at 3593-96.
46. Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. at 522.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
48. Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. at 524.
exclusively to the guidelines established by the Colonial case for
finding a rule violation actionable.49 The court found that the
plaintiff met the Colonial standard because the rules alleged to
have been violated were "an integral part in SEC regulation" in
furtherance of the purpose to "insure fair dealing and to protect
investors"50 and were "precise."5
Although the Starkman court referred to the likelihood that
Seroussi's conduct was part of a scheme to "defraud" 52 the plain-
tiff, this reference does not indicate that the court would refuse to
find a nonfraudulent violation actionable. The court did not state
that the implication of a cause of action depends upon whether
fraud was present. The court merely pointed to the possibility of
employee fraud in emphasizing the importance of the NYSE rules
under consideration in furthering the goals of fair dealing and in-
vestor protection.53 Even if the court regarded Seroussi's viola-
tion of NYSE Rule 345.16 as fraudulent,54 the plaintiff's ability to
state a cause of action against the brokerage firm for its failure to
supervise under Rule 405 was not made conditional upon any
knowing participation on its part in the employee's fraud.55
The district court in Bush v. Bruns Nordeman & Co.56 failed to
take advantage of an opportunity to close the door to private ac-
tions based on negligent violations of NYSE Rule 405.57 The
plaintiff, a trustee in bankruptcy, sued for losses allegedly caused
by the defendant's use of the bankrupt's wrongfully converted
funds. The plaintiff alleged both Rule lOb-5 antifraud violations
and noncompliance with Rule 405, stating that the defendant
"knew or should have known that such funds had been wrong-
fully converted."58 The court refused to dismiss, noting that be-
49. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 817 (1966). See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
50. Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. at 523-24.
51. Id. In Colonial, the court disapproved of implying a private action for vio-
lation of a broad, generalized rule that is something of a "catchall." The vagueness
of such a rule would indicate that Congress did not intend it to give rise to a civil
claim. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 817 (1966).
52. Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. at 524.
53. Id.
54. Perhaps a violation of this rule prohibiting a representative from partici-
pating in customer transactions is by its nature so calculated to generate exces-
sive commissions for the representative that fraud may be inferred from any
violation of the rule.
55. Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. at 524.
56. [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,674 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
57. But see Architectural League v. Bartos, 404 F. Supp. 304, 314 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
58. Bush v. Bruns Nordeman & Co., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 93,674, at 93,007 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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cause the alleged violations of Rule 10b-5 and Rule 405 were
"inextricably linked" it was too early in the proceedings to deter-
mine whether the defendant had violated Rule 405 and whether
such a violation gives rise to a private cause of action. 59 The hold-
ing does not necessarily authorize a cause of action when the de-
fendant is merely negligent ("should have known") because the
court sustained the plaintiff's claim on the alternative allegations
that the defendant "knew or should have known" 60 the source of
the customer's funds. However, the court's failure to indicate that
the allegation of negligence standing alone would not support a
cause of action suggests the lack of an established fraud require-
ment.
MERITS OF THE NONFRAUD CLAIM
The argument for allowing a private cause of action for a
nonfraudulent rule violation must be considered before focusing
on particular obstacles confronting plaintiffs. The case for recog-
nizing a federal cause of action for negligent violations of NASD
and NYSE rules is most persuasive when the rule in question by
its terms imposes a negligence standard of care upon broker-deal-
ers. NYSE Rule 40561 is the best example of such a rule. The rule
directs every member broker-dealer to "[u]se due diligence to
learn the facts relative to every customer, every cash or margin
account accepted or carried" and to "[s] upervise diligently all ac-
counts handled by registered representatives." 62 This language
prescribes a standard of conduct very similar to the "due care"
concept imposed by tort law as the standard for determining
whether behavior is negligent.63 Rule 405 requires the investment
firm to take certain steps to investigate customers, their source of
funds, and their needs in order to determine whether the cus-
tomer or the public may ]'e jeopardized by a given transaction.64
If these duties are rot carried out with the requisite diligence, the
rule is violated.
The due diligence requirement of Rule 405 appears to prohibit
negligent as well as fraudulent or willful conduct. Rule 405 should
59. Id. at 93,008.
60. Id. at 93,007-08 (emphasis added).
61. Rule 405 is set out in note 5 supra.
62. Id.
63. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 31 (4th ed. 1971).
64. Wolfson v. Baker, 444 F. Supp. 1124, 1134 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
be contrasted with section 20 of the Exchange Act of 1934, which
expressly provides a good faith defense for controlling persons
who may otherwise be held responsible under this section for se-
curities law violations by their controlled employees.65 To hold
that a violation of Rule 405 is actionable only when the violation is
in some way fraudulent is to disregard the plain language of the
rule and to rewrite it to include a good faith defense. What point
is there in looking to a rule for a basis of liability when so little
regard is paid to its specific provisions?
LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE
ACKNOWLEDGED PURPOSES OF SELF-REGULATION
The fraud/nonfraud distinction is particularly arbitrary in light
of the reasons given for implying a federal cause of action for the
violation of exchange and dealer association rules. Recognition of
a cause of action for negligent rules violations would be consis-
tent with the principles that have led courts to conclude that
these rules may properly support some kind of private claim.
In Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.,66 the court stated that
whether violation of a rule is actionable depends in part upon the
rule's "place in the regulatory scheme."6 7 According to Colonial,
the rule violated must be specific and must amount to a substi-
tute for an SEC regulation, as opposed to one that merely
prescribes broad ethical standards.68 The court settled upon this
requirement in reliance upon the Supreme Court's decision in JL
Case Co. v. Borak,69 which held that the courts may imply private
remedies to effectuate the congressional purpose and federal pol-
icy behind the Exchange Act.
70
The relevance of congressional purpose in implying federal
remedies has since been reemphasized in Cort v. Ash.71 The
65. 15 U.S.C. § 7St(a) (1976). This section provides in relevant part:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable
under any provision of this chapter... shall also be liable jointly and sev-
erally with and to the same extent as such controlled person is liable, un-
less the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of ac-
tion.
66. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817.(1966).
67. Id. at 182.
68. Id.
69. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). The Borak ca-e dealt with implication of a private
cause of action for violation of an actual statutory provision of the Exchange Act.
The Colonial court applied the principle of Borak to the analogous question of im-
plied liability based on a rule of the NASD.
70. Id. at 433.
71. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). This case, like Borak, concerned implied remedies for
violation of federal statutes. Cort v. Ash has been relied upon where an exchange
rule was involved. Wolfson v. Baker, 444 F. Supp. 1124, 1135 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
[VOL. 16: 773, 1979] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash divided the congressional purpose
inquiry into two questions. The first question is whether the
plaintiff seeking an implied cause of action is a member of the
class that Congress designed the law in question to benefit.72 The
second question is whether implication of a remedy is consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme.
73
Accordingly, courts recognizing an implied cause of action
under NYSE Rule 40574 have first concluded that the rule's pur-
pose is to protect the investor.7 5 The NASD "suitability" rule
76
has also been found to serve this purpose.7 7 The underlying pur-
poses of the Exchange Act, which include protecting "the public
and investors against malpractices in the securities and financial
markets, ' 78 support these conclusions. Self-regulation through
exchange and dealer association rules was designed to further
these underlying purposes without adding to the burden on the
government bureaucracy. 9 If the foregoing considerations can
lead courts to determine as a threshold matter that a private
cause of action may be implied for violations of a given rule, the
same considerations could justify remedies for negligent viola-
tions. A customer who- is injured as a result of the brokerage
firm's inadequate supervision of its registered representative is
clearly within the class of investors needing protection whether
the lack of supervision was caused by negligence or by fraud.
Furthermore, the "malpractices in the securities and financial
markets" that the Exchange Act was designed to prevent argua-
bly encompass negligent as well as fraudulent behavior. Allowing
a negligently injured customer to recoup his losses in federal
72. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78.
73. Id.
74. Rule 405 is set out in note 5 supra.
75. See, e.g., Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d
135, 142 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Wolfson v. Baker, 444 F. Supp.
1124, 1135 (M.D. Fla. 1978). But see Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549
F.2d 164, 167 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977).
76. Article II, § 2 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice is set out in note 6
supra.
77. Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1041 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), aff'd on other grounds, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978).
78. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1964] 2 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3013, 3016.
79. See S. REP. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 3-5 (1938); H-LR REP. No. 2307,
75th Cong., 3d Sess. 4-5 (1938). But cf. Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549
F.2d 164, 168 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977) (implying private actions
from rules violations may discourage self-regulation).
gourt would not only be consistent with the Exchange Act's inves-
tor protection purpose, it would further such a purpose.
The courts obviously are not compelled to imply a cause of ac-
tion each time Congress' goal of investor protection may thereby
be advanced. However, judicial concern for investors has
prompted courts to take the initiative in declaring the availability
of civil remedies for violation of the self-regulatory rules0 despite
the failure of Congress to so provide. Given the judicially created
nature of these remedies, it would not be too great a leap for
courts to define the limits of liability to include claims for negli-
gence.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRAUD REQUIREMENT
Although the same purposes that are served by recognizing pri-
vate federal claims in general for supervision and suitability rules
violations may be advanced by extending this right of action to
negligently injured investors, the trend in several circuits has
been to deny such relief in the absence of fraud.81 Such a serious
limitation on the utility of exchange and dealer association rules
as vehicles for civil liability can be traced to language in the Colo-
nial decision.82 In that case Judge Friendly stated that although
certain rules may give rise to a cause of action in appropriate cir-
cumstances, "the case for implication would be strongest when
the rule imposes an explicit duty unknown to the common law."
83
Although Judge Friendly did not formulate a precise test for de-
termining how much of a departure from common law remedies is
necessary to justify a federal cause of action, it is clear that the
court was cautioning against the extension of exclusive federal ju-
risdiction "into preserves traditionally occupied by the states."
84
However, Judge Friendly's concern was not with the possibility of
conflict between state and federal decisions. On the contrary, his
80. Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
963 (1970); Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
81. See Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164, 168 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977); Parsons v. Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes,
447 F. Supp. 482, 494 (M.D.N.C. 1977), affd per curiam, 571 F.2d 203 (1978); Rolf v.
Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd on
other grounds, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978).
82. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 817 (1966).
83. Id. at 182.
84. Id. at 183 n.6. The Supreme Court has since indicated that implication of a
federal cause of action for violations of federal statutes should depend in part
upon whether "the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law."
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
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concern was that federal courts might become flooded with "gar-
den variety" customer-broker litigation even though "there was
no indication that the case would be decided differently under
state law."85
Judge Friendly's reluctance to involve federal courts except
"when the rule imposes an explicit duty unknown to the common
law" has been interpreted as precluding a federal claim for negli-
gent violations.8 6 On its face, this interpretation seems persua-
sive. The general duty to refrain from negligent conduct is, of
course, not "unknown to the common law." However, Judge
Friendly's use of the word "explicit" should not be overlooked.
The "explicit" duties imposed by certain exchange rules are not
necessarily known to the common law. For example, it is uncer-
tain whether all state courts would recognize the duties imposed
by NYSE Rule 405 upon exchange members to use diligence in in-
vestigating their customers and selecting only securities suitable
to their needs8 7 without reference to the rule.
To prove an allegation of negligence in state court, an investor
might find it necessary to introduce the rule as evidence of the
standard of care in the professional community.88 The rule itself
becomes the ultimate source of duty to the extent that a state
court must look to the specific duties imposed by the exchange
rule before the trier of fact can determine whether the conduct
was negligent. Because the rule is the product of the Exchange
Act's self-regulatory scheme,89 it can hardly be said that the ques-
tion of liability based on the rule's unique duties is a '"preserve
traditionally occupied by the states."90
Furthermore, it is doubtful that the federal courts actually re-
fuse to recognize rights of action simply because the basis of re-
lief is known to common law. For example, a district court
recently allowed an independent cause of action against a broker-
85. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d at 183.
86. See S. JAFFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SECURIrIES MARKETS 196 (1977).
87. Rule 405 is set out in note 5 supra.
88. See Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 697-
99, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 228-29 (1968).
89. Section 4(b) of the Exchange Act provides that no exchange shall be regis-
tered unless it adopts rules "designed... to promote just and equitable principles
of trade ... and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78f(b) (5) (1976).
90. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183 n.6 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
age firm under the common law doctrine of respondeat superior.91
THE IMPACT OF THE SCIENTER REQUIREMENT IN ANTIFRAUD
ACTIONS
The Supreme Court's attempt to check the proliferation of ac-
tions brought under the antifraud provisions of section 10(b)92 of
the Exchange Act and SEC Rule l0b-593 may bolster the view that
the dictum in Colonial should limit the implication of private ac-
tions to fraudulent violations of rules. The Supreme Court in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder94 held that a private cause of action
under section 10(b) or Rule lOb-5 requires allegations of scienter
or willful or intentional misconduct. 95 Although it is not clear
whether recklessness satisfies the Hochfelder requirement,96
mere negligence is insufficient.
At least one court of appeals has concluded that the scienter re-
quirement of Hochfelder controls the implication of actions for
breach of exchange and association rules. In Utah State Univer-
sity v. Bear, Stearns & Co.,97 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit applied the Supreme Court's view of lOb-5 actions in
Hochfelder to claims based on violations of NASD and NYSE
rules. The court upheld the trial court's dismissal of these claims
because the violations were not alleged to be tantamount to fraud.
The court noted that "something more than mistake or negligence
must be shown."9 8 The court did not explain why the principles
of Hochfelder, a lOb-5 case, should necessarily govern implied lia-
bility for rules violations.
In light of what has been called the climate of "retrenchment"99
evidenced by the Hochfelder Court's curtailing of private claims
brought under the Exchange Act, other courts might be expected
to follow the Utah State University case. However, this decision's
application of Hoch/elder may be more far-reaching than is imme-
diately apparent. Although it purports to circumscribe the private
action for rules violations within the boundaries of the fraud re-
quirement, Utah State University essentially undermines the in-
91. Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203, 214 (D. Mass.
1978).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
94. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
95. Id. at 201.
96. The Supreme Court did not expressly decide that recklessness satisfies
the scienter requirement for actions under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. Id. at 193.94 n.12.
97. 549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977).
98. Id. at 168-69. See Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 56 (2d
Cir. 1978) (dissenting opinion).
99. S. JAPFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SECUrrIES MARKETS 253 (1977).
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dependent viability of any action under these rules. If a broker's
violation involves intentional or willful conduct tantamount to
fraud, the injured investor will be able to make out a cause of ac-
tion under SEC Rule 10b-5.100 The availability of a cause of action
derived from the rule violation itself is meaningless and superflu-
ous for the plaintiff if the action depends on alleging the same
facts necessary for a successful lOb-5 claim.
To conclude that a court's decision to apply the scienter re-
quirement of Hochfelder to rules violations does more than
merely limit a plaintiff's action to fraudulent violations would be
logically consistent. The imposition of the Hochfelder scienter
standard suggests that there can be no action based on the rules
violations as rules violations. In other words, a violation would
not support a private action because it is a violation, but only to
the extent that the conduct which happens to constitute the viola-
tion is independently actionable under the antifraud provisions of
Rule 10b-5.
The Utah State University case is puzzling because the court
fails to reach the foregoing conclusion even after emphasizing the
fraud requirement. Instead, the court insists that it recognizes
"that in an appropriate case there may be an implied cause of ac-
tion for private redress for violation of association or exchange
rules."101 That the court conceives of such an action as existing
independently of a 10b-5 action is suggested by the court's discus-
sion of the plaintiff's 10b-5 claim in a separate section of the opin-
ion.102
In any given case in which a plaintiff successfully states a cause
of action against his broker-dealer under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, the question whether an independent action exists for vio-
lation of self-regulatory rules is of course largely academic. As
long as the plaintiff can recover under the antifraud provisions,
the court may find it unnecessary to articulate clearly an alterna-
tive theory of liability or to stress the theory's independent na-
ture. As a result, actions for rules violations for the most part
have been allowed to subsist in the shadow of 10b-5 claims. The
100. A broker's fraudulent rule violation would fall under the provision of Rule
10b-5 that makes it unlawful "to engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
101. 549 F.2d at 169.
102. See id.
two theories of liability are so often confused in the cases 103 that
it is not only difficult to separate them, it is even more difficult to
understand whether and to what extent they are meant to be sep-
arate. Although Colonial called for restraint in the creation of im-
plied actions, the decision did not indicate that an action for rules
violations should be recognized only as part of a Rule 10b-5 ac-
tion. However, with the advent of Hochfelder and its definitive
limitation of 10b-5 actions, to inquire whether the two theories of
liability are distinct is now more than academic. If the two theo-
ries are distinct, to allow claims for negligent violations without
running afoul of the precise holding of Hochfelder might be possi-
ble.1 0 4
Hochfelder does not compel application of the scienter standard
to actions for rules violations. In rejecting a cause of action for
negligence under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the Hochfelder
Court based its decision in large part on the statute's use of the
words "manipulative," "device," and "contrivance." The Court
emphasized that these terms "make unmistakable a congressional
intent to proscribe a type of conduct quite different from negli-
gence."105 In contrast, the "suitability" and "supervision" rules of
the NYSE and NASD contain no such reference to willful or in-
tentional conduct.106 Furthermore, the Hochfelder Court's charac-
terization of section 10(b) as a "catchall" provision suggests that
the broad scope of unspecified conduct that may fall within this
section necessitates a more restrictive approach. 07 To the extent
the self-regulatory rules address themselves to the more finite du-
ties of supervision and selection of suitable investments, the po-
tential scope of liability is not as great as under section 10(b).
Therefore, similar restrictions are not as warranted, and negli-
gence should be recognized.
Perhaps sensing that outright recognition of negligent violations
of self-regulatory rules runs counter to the spirit, if not the rule,
of Hochfelder, the Utah State University court refused to go this
far. However, the court did continue to treat actions under self-
regulatory rules as existing independently of 10b-5 actions. What
emerges from Utah State University is an expedient compromise.
On the one hand, the court manages to avoid delivering the death-
blow to actions brought under the rules. On the other hand, the
court uses Hochfelder to obscure further these actions in the
shadow of 10b-5.
103. E. BRoDsKY, GUIDE TO SECURITIES LITIGATION 158 (1974).
104. 1 S. GOLDBERG, FRAUDULENT BROKER-DEALER PRACTICES 3-29.6 (1978).
105. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1975).
106. See notes 5-6 supra.
107. 425 U.S. at 206.
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The imposition of the Hochfelder scienter requirement upon ac-
tions for violations of the suitability and supervision duties can-
not be reconciled with the notion of a true cause of action based
on these rules. The statement in Utah State University that
avoids this ultimate conclusion 0 8 amounts to little more than lip
service to the idea generated by Colonial and its progeny that
self-regulatory rules may have a recognizable role as a basis for
damages actions in furtherance of the Exchange Act's investor
protection purpose. If Hochfelder controls, it is difficult to imag-
ine what role the rules could properly play in an action for dam-
ages. One writer has suggested that the rules may serve as
"adjuncts" in actions brought under the antifraud provisions, "re-
fining the definition of fraud."109 This suggestion raises the issue
of the legal effect of an "adjunct." In what respects, if any, may a
federal court's consideration of an exchange rule properly influ-
ence the court's determination of whether the plaintiff has stated
a cause of action for fraud under Rule lOb-5?
Relegating the rules to "adjunct" status probably means that
the rules would have no real influence on the outcome of an an-
tifraud action against a broker. If the plaintiff alleges a failure to
supervise under NYSE Rule 405, the court must first ignore the
letter of the rule, which contemplates a violation by negligence" 0
or without scienter. Next, the court must decide whether the bro-
ker's conduct "operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit"M
on the plaintiff with the requisite scienter. Resolution of this in-
quiry does not require resort to the rule at all. The conduct either
does or does not operate as a fraud or deceit. As an adjunct, the
rule is merely suggestive of one context in which a broker may
perpetrate a fraud or deceit.
CONCLUSION
The fraud requirement effectively undermines the implication
of private actions from violations of the self-regulatory rules as a
means of protecting investors in furtherance of the purposes of
the Exchange Act. So limited, this theory of recovery provides in-
vestors no advantage over section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions.
108. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
109. S. JAFFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS 197 (1977).
110. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
111. See note 100 supra.
Thus, the propriety of the fraud requirement depends upon the
larger question of the desirability of recognizing an implied cause
of action for any manner of self-regulatory rule violation. No clear
indication exists of legislative intent either to create or to deny
any private action under the self-regulatory scheme. 112 Therefore,
the courts must decide whether such an action merits preserva-
tion and, if so, whether its survival necessitates repudiation of the
fraud standard. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed either
of these questions.
The prospect of liability for negligent violations would promote
the purpose of investor protection in several ways. The imposi-
tion of liability for negligence would protect investors prospec-
tively by expanding the deterrent function of the rules. After a
negligent violation, the negligently injured investor would be pro-
tected by the possibility of restitutionary relief in federal court.
The availability of a federal court not only provides the plaintiff
with a choice of forum but more importantly provides the only
opportunity for trial when the brokerage agreement contains an
arbitration clause.113
There is concern that any expansion of implied liability may
discourage the formulation and retention of self-regulatory rules
by member organizations." 4 However, to the extent member or-
ganizations fear the prospect of expanded liability, they could be
acknowledging that existing internal sanctions have been ineffec-
tive in bringing about a satisfactory level of compliance with ex-
isting rules."l5 If the standards in the industry in fact do not
conform to the rules, the legislative purpose of investor protection
is thwarted. The courts might have a duty under such circum-
stances "to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to
make effective the congressional purpose."" 6 The implication of
private actions for both fraudulent and negligent violations may
be necessary to effectively protect investors as long as internal
sanctions remain inadequate.
The greatest appeal of the fraud requirement is its effect in cur-
tailing the flood of federal litigation contemplated by Judge
Friendly.117 However, other ways to manage the volume of ac-
112. Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the Over-the-Counter Securities Markets:
Implied Liabilities Based on NASD Rules, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 633, 642 (1966). See
generally Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
113. See Starkmnan v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518, 522-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
114. Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164, 168 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977).
115. See Comment, Implied Civil Liability Arising From Violation of the Rules
of the NASD, 8 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 151, 155-56 (1975).
116. JI. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
117. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
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tions brought under the self-regulatory rules exist. The courts
could direct their focus to the chief purpose of particular rules,
recognizing as actionable only violations of rules designed for the
direct protection of investors and denying actions brought under
rules that have only a "housekeeping function."" 8 With respect
to a rule designed to protect investors, actionability could never-
theless be denied if the rule were a broad, generalized "catchall"
and therefore inappropriate for civil liability." 9 Ultimately only
rules that have the requisite purpose and specificity would sup-
port a cause of action. By limiting the contours of actionability
according to the foregoing guidelines, the courts might feel more
free to permit actions based on negligence when the particular
rule seems to contemplate negligent violations.12
0
THOMAS MAGLIOZZI
118. See Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 141
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
119. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
120. See notes 61-64 and accompanying text supra.

